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CASE NOTES
During this long history of litigation the Suprenic Court has accepted
and then abandoned "consent," "doing business," and "presence" as the
standard for measuring the extent of state judicial power over foreign
corporations. A trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permis-
sible scope of state jurisdiction over such corporations. The McGee case
underscores this trend by minimizing the contacts needed for "substantial
connection" with the state.
CRIMINAL LAW-FAILURE TO REGISTER NOT PUNISH-
ABLE WITHOUT ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF
FELON REGISTRATION ORDINANCE
The defendant, Lambert, was convicted of violating an ordinance of
the city of Los Angeles requiring the registration of persons previously
convicted of a felony if they remained in the city for over five days. The
defendant was a resident of Los Angeles for over seven years at the time
of her arrest. Within that time, she had been convicted of forgery which
the State of California classified as a felony. She had not been registered
under the ordinance at the time of her arrest. The defendant was found
guilty and fined $250. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held
that although Blackstone's requisite of a "vicious will"' is not necessary
to constitute a crime, since conduct alone will often suffice, nevertheless,
where conduct wholly passive is involved-a mere failure to register-
there must be actual knowledge of a duty to register coupled with that
failure before a conviction under the ordinance could stand. The court
had to assume that the defendant had no actual knowledge of the regis-
tration requirement as she offered proof of this defense which was re-
fused in the California trial. The judgment was reversed. Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
Blackstone defined the requisites for public wrongs as follows:
For though, in foro conscientiae, a fixed design or will to do an unlawful act is
almost as heinous as the commission of it, yet, as no temporal tribunal can search
the heart, or fathom the intentions of the mind, otherwise than as they are dem-
onstrated by outward actions, it therefore cannot punish for what it cannot
know. For which reason in all temporal jurisdictions an overt act, or some open
evidence of an intended crime, is necessary, in order to demonstrate the de-
pravity of the will, before the man is liable to punishment. And, as a vicious
will without a vicious act is no civil crime, so, on the other hand, an unwarrant-
able act without a vicious will is no crime at all.2
Certain civil cases dispensing with the element of wilfulness involve
statutes enacted to protect employees or dependents of employees en-
gaged in hazardous industries operated by the defendant. The employee
1 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *21. 2 ]bid.
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is assured of physical safety or his dependents are assured of economic
security regardless of the wilfulness of the defendant's statutory viola-
tions.3
There are cases where wilfulness has relevancy only to a possible crimi-
nal aspect of a proceeding and where its absence has no relevancy as to
its civil aspect. Thus it has been held that where proof of a wilful attempt
to evade payment of a tax is not enough to overcome all reasonable doubt
as to the existence of a guilty will so as to convict a defendant for a felony,
the defendant may nevertheless remain liable to pay fifty percent again
as much as the tax deficiency so that the government can collect revenue
and reimbursement for the court proceedings. 4
In addition to the last case discussed, the requisite of wilfulness is a
factor in other cases involving fraud and the recovery of criminal penal-
ties. Defendants have exhibited a wilful disposition and have been held for
penalties for conspiracy to defraud the government in the submission of
bids5 and for wilful misrepresentations on sales of dairy products to the
government.6
In certain criminal cases, the requisite of wilfulness is not explicitly
resorted to in holding a defendant responsible for his violations. The re-
sults may be had by balancing the interests between equally innocent
parties, or by imputing knowledge and wilfulness to the defendant, or
the record may disclose a wantonness as to probable consequences. United
States v. Balint7 held that to constitute the offense of selling drugs con-
trary to the Anti Narcotics Act, it is not necessary that the seller be aware
of their character as narcotic drugs. Congress was said to have weighed
the hardships to the equally innocent sellers and buyers and to have de-
cided that it was preferable to make the seller suffer a penalty.8 Another
narcotics case, United States v. Bebrman,9 held that a physician who gave
narcotic drug prescriptions to a drug addict cannot escape conviction for
3 Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559 (1911) where the court held
that whether the carrier knew its cars were out of order or not was immaterial. Its duty
was to know that they were in order and kept in order at all times. New York Central
R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) held that Congress can require railroads to pay
compensation to dependents of employees killed in the course of employment regard-
less of the wilfulness or fault of defendant railroad.
4 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
5 United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 41 F. Supp. 197 (W.D. Pa., 1941).
6Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949).
7258 U.S. 250 (1922).
8 Ibid., at 254: "Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent
seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the
drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided."
9 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
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violating the act by contending that he comes within the dispensation
granted to registered physicians prescribing drugs for patients. The facts
show that the defendant knew that his patient was a drug addict but was
not concerned with the consequences resulting to the patient from the
treatment.'0
There was a conviction for violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act in United States v. Dotterweich.11 The defendant, presi-
dent of a pharmaceutical concern, was held guilty of a misdemeanor
when his firm committed a misbranding violation under the act. He had
no personal knowledge of the violation but knowledge and fault were
imputed to him in his status as president. The court put the result partly
on the congressional balancing of relative hardships between equally inno-
cent parties and partly on the defendant's opportunity to inform himself
of the necessary measures to protect the public. 12 There were convictions
in other cases involving the same act, where the defendant wantonly and
negligently placed drugs in different boxes not containing instructions as
to their use 13 and where the defendant was held bound to know that his
goods violated the provisions of the act as a creator of a dangerous instru-
mentality so that a lack of any actual knowledge indicated a recklessness
on his part.14
In accordance with what has been already discussed, it has been said
that in the field of criminal law the meaning of the terms "wilful" and
"wilfully" is rather flexible.',
There may be a wilful act without knowingly doing a wrong1" as a
malicious act is not necessary, 17 and neither is an intent to violate the
law.' The words "wilful" and "wilfully" are used to characterize con-
duct such as evinces an intentional or reckless indifference to the safety
10 Ibid. "1320 U.S. 277 (1943).
12 Ibid., at 281: "Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for
criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good
it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing
in responsible relation to a public danger." At 285: "Balancing relative hardships, Con-
gress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity of inform-
ing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers
before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent
public who are wholly helpless."
'3 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
14 United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F. 2d 1008 (C.A. 7th, 1947).
15 Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 166, 221 S.W. 2d 857 (1949).
10 Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U.S. 71 (1893); Lawrence-Williams Co. v. Societe Enfants
Gombault Et Cie., 52 F. 2d 774 (C.A. 6th, 1931); Ex Parte Allen, 241 Ala. 137, 2 So. 2d
321 (1941).
'7T Brown v. Brown, 124 N.C. 19, 32 S.E. 320 (1899).
18 State v. James, 36 Wash. 2d 882, 221 P. 2d 482 (1950).
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of others,"' or a disregard for the rights of others,-" or the wanton indif-
ference to the natural consequences of the act,2' or a reckless disregard
as to whether or not the act is in violation of law.
22
"Wilful" and "wilfully" may also import a specific intent to violate the
law,) a a specific intent to do what the law forbids, 24 a deliberate intent,25
or purpose,26 to do a wrongful act.
However, the terms may also be used to signify that a person has failed
to obey a statute when he had knowledge of the facts of his disobedience.
27
In District of Columbia v. Brooke,28 the defendant, a resident property
owner of the District of Columbia, was obligated to pay a penal fine for
failure to connect his property with a public sewer within thirty days
after notice of his failure was given to him. The court in the case of
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,29 affirmed a judgment whereby the
defendant had to pay damages to the state when it had continued to cut
timber after it had notice that the extension of the timber cutting permit
granted to it by the state had expired. The defendant in United States v.
Ryan3:0 was held guilty of a misdemeanor when he wilfully violated a
provision of the Labor Management Relations Act forbidding a repre-
sentative of employees from accepting money from an employer of such
employees. The court said in part that wilfulness is shown by taking
money with knowledge in the defendant that he was so taking it and
with knowledge that the giver was an employer of the employees repre-
sented by him.
"Wilful" and "wilfully" describe a person who, having free choice,
either intentionally disregards a statute or is plainly indifferent to its
requirements. 3' Violations of registration laws often fall into this aspect
of the definition. The defendant in United States v. Kabriger32 did not
19 Haacke v. Lease, 41 N.E. 2d 590 (Ohio App., 1941); Southern Ry. Co. v. McNeeley,
44 Ind. App. 126, 88 N.E. 710 (1909).
2( Beatty v. United States, 191 F. 2d 317 (C.A. 8th, 1951); Nelson v. Deering Imple-
ment Co., 241 Iowa 1248, 42 N.W. 2d 522 (1950); Piazza v. Zimmermann, 49 So. 2d 491
(La. App., 1950); Haacke v. Lease, 41 N.E. 2d 590 (Ohio App., 1941).
21 Duro Co. v. Wishnevsky, 126 N.J.L. 7, 16 A. 2d 64 (1940).
22 United States v. Schneiderman, 102 F. Supp. 87 (S.D. Cal., 1951).
23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.
"5 Williams v. People, 26 Colo. 272, 57 Pac. 701 (1899).
26 City of Baird v. West Texas Utilities Co., 145 S.W. 2d 965 (Tex. Civ. App., 1940).
27 Schmeller v. United States, 143 F. 2d 544 (C.A. 6th, 1944).
28 214 U.S. 138 (1909). 29) 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
30 128 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. N.Y., 1955).
81 United States v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 303 U.S. 239 (1938); Paddock v. Sie-
mnoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.'W. 2d 428 (1949).
32 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
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register for a Federal Excise Tax on the business of accepting wagers
because he feared possible self-incrimination for a potential charge of
state gambling regulation laws. In Bryant v. Zinmerman,88 the defendant
was convicted of a misdemeanor for belonging to a secret oath bound
organization after he became aware that it had not filed a membership
list in accordance with a New York registration law. The court in Lewis
Publishing Co. v. Morgan 34 upheld the contention of the government that
the defendant should be denied the use of the privileges of second class
mail when he refused to file with the Postmaster General a statement of
the names and addresses of his publishers and editors after having been
given the statutory requisite of ten days notice of its original failure to
file.
However the courts are particularly insistent that notice of criminal
violation be properly given the defendant so that he may have adequate
knowledge of the facts of his violation. A notice given by registered mail
is proper notice of a violation of a state Blue Sky Law requiring registra-
tion for a permit to sell securities.85 A defendant, aware that the business
in which he is engaged, could affect adversely the public health and
safety if wantonly and improperly performed, is given fair notice that
an activity connected with that business is a criminal violation of a statute
enacted to protect the public health and safety against such improper
performance, if the reasonable scope of the terms of the statute could be
said to comprise such an activity. A provision against misbranding could
be said to include misleading advertising.86 A section of the Immigration
Act requiring the deportation of aliens convicted more than once in this
country of a "crime involving moral turpitude" was upheld where the
court held that the phrase includes fraudulent conduct and noted that
Congress had forewarned the defendant that he was subject to deportation
for twice conspiring to defraud the United States. 7
However where the terms of a statute are so vague and indefinite as
not to inform men of common intelligence as to what comprises a viola-
tion of a state penal law prohibiting the sales of literature which glorifies
crime there is no fair notice of such a violation. 38 Likewise, a defendant
is not put on notice as to how a public presentation of a motion picture
distributed by it violates a state statute forbidding the public showing of
33 278 U.S. 63 (1928). 34 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
35 Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
86 Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948); United States v. Hohensee. 243 F. 2d
367 (C.A. 3d, 1957).
37 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
8 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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"sacrilegious" films.3 The United States Supreme Court has invalidated a
statute imposing punishment on "gangsters" who were classified as any
person "not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member
of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted
at least three times of being a disorderly person or who has been convicted
of any crime in this or any other state." The statute was said to be too
vague to notify a person of a criminal violation.4 0
It has long been a principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that the
element of will is to be taken into consideration in determining guilt for
crimes and it is not lightly to be imputed to the defendant nor is it to be
supposed that a legislature had intended to eliminate consideration of this
element.41
Although it has been held that the terms "wilful" and "wilfully" may
be used in a sense which does not imply any malice or wrong,4 2 or any-
thing necessarily blamable,43 Mr. Justice Holmes has written:
[A] law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the
average member of the community would be too severe for that community to
bear. 44
And as Mr. Justice Douglas concludes in the Lambert case:
Its severity lies in the absence of an opportunity either to avoid the conse-
quences of the law or to defend any prosecution brought under it. Where a per-
son did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the
probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due
process. 45
39 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
40 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
4! Mr. Justice Murphy dissenting in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943).
42 Cole v. Loew's Inc., 8 F.R.D. 508 (S.D. Cal., 1948); Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah
542, 189 P. 2d 961 (1948); Davis v. Morris, 37 Cal. 2d 269, 99 P. 2d 345 (1940); Shields v.
State, 184 Okla. 618, 89 P. 2d 756 (1939).
43 Cole v. Loew's Inc., 8 F.R.D. 508 (S.D. Cal., 1948); Wilson v. Security-First Nat'l
Bank of Los Angeles, 84 Cal. 2d 427, 190 P. 2d 975 (1948); Davis v. Morris, 37 Cal. 2d
269, 99 P. 2d 345 (1940).
44 Holmes, The Common Law 50 (1881).
45 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957).
CRIMINAL LAW-SUCCESSIVE SENTENCES FOR SEPA-
RATE REFUSALS TO ANSWER RELATED QUESTIONS
AFTER A GENERAL REFUSAL HELD IMPROPER
MULTIPLICATION OF OFFENSES
Mrs. Oleta Yates, an admitted executive of the American Communist
Party, while on trial for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act,' took the
1 18 U.S.C.A. S 2385 (1951), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (Supp. 1956).
